2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.: General
4 May 2015
English
Original: French

New York, 27 April-22 May 2015

Measures to promote the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East and to fully implement the 1995 Middle East resolution

Report submitted by Algeria

1. Algeria considers that the creation of nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs), pursuant to Article VIII of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (the NPT), effectively contributes to the consolidation of regional and international peace and security, and to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and achievement of the goals of nuclear disarmament.

2. It therefore supports the promotion of nuclear weapon-free zones throughout the world. As Africa is the geographic region to which it belongs, it signed up to the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa issued by the Organization of African Unity. It also welcomes the entry into force of the Africa-Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty), which it was the third African country to ratify on 11 February 1998.

3. In the same spirit, Algeria welcomed the creation of NWFZs in Latin America and the Caribbean, in the South Pacific, in South-east Asia and in Central Asia, respectively, by the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Central Asia. These instruments have unquestionably made an effective contribution to reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation and strengthening international peace and security

4. Algeria applauds the holding of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Forum on the relevance of ongoing experiences for the creation of an NWFZ in the Middle East, held in Vienna on 21 and 22 November 2011. The experiences of the five existing zones (Latin America and the Caribbean, South Pacific, South-east Asia, Africa, Central Asia), and of two regional verification agreements (EURATOM and ABACC), presented on that occasion, confirmed the feasibility of creating such a zone in the Middle East. Nonetheless, the importance of mutual trust between the States involved was noted, together with their common political will and the decisive role of the United Nations Organization, the IAEA and the five nuclear-weapon States, to bring about such a process. In this context, Algeria also expresses its appreciation at the IAEA for the information documents prepared prior to the conference on the creation of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

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5. Algeria reiterates the importance and validity of the goal of establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, as a permanent and priority demand of the international community. It remains firmly supportive of that objective, which it views as an essential element for the stability and security of States in the region. Achieving that objective is a way to establish and promote regional and international peace and security.

6. It stresses that the objective of creating an NWFZ in the Middle East reflects an actual security requirement specific to the region. It thus rests on a specific political and legal foundation, in so far as it has been the subject of a resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. This resolution is an integral element in the framework of a global commitment that led the Arab States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to accept the indefinite extension of the treaty in 1995, in exchange for the creation of an NWFZ in the Middle East.

7. Algeria also notes that the final document of the Eighth Treaty Review Conference reaffirmed the continuing importance and validity of that resolution until its aims and objectives are attained. According to this document, a conference on the creation of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction should have been convened in 2012. Unfortunately, that objective has not yet been achieved owing to Israel's refusal. Algeria, with other Arab partners, has participated in the consultations held by the facilitator Jaakko Laajava (Finland), and it has supported his efforts to bring this process to fruition. Algeria again calls for the implementation of the NWFZ pursuant to the 1995 resolution. The States parties have explicitly asked Israel to adhere to the treaty and to submit its nuclear facilities to the IAEA safeguards regime.

8. As part of the process making it possible to fully apply the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, the States parties had agreed at the 2010 Review Conference that "The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, will convene a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States. The 2012 Conference shall take as its terms of reference the 1995 Resolution."

9. Algeria wanted to thank the United Nations Secretary General, the Conference Facilitator Mr. Jaakko Laajava and the sponsors of the 1995 Resolution for their efforts.

Algeria deeply deplores the fact that this conference decision has not been implemented, despite its active and constructive commitment and good faith, and that of Arab countries, throughout the various consultations held by the Facilitator in the presence of the other sponsors, owing to the attitude of Israel aimed at diverting the process from its mandate and rendering the 1995 resolution devoid of content.

10. As a State party to the Treaty, Algeria signed in 1996 a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA; and it fully respects the obligations and commitments assumed under the Treaty. It considers that the comprehensive application of all of the provisions of the Treaty and its universal nature,

particularly in the Middle East region, are necessary conditions for the Treaty's integrity, authority and credibility.

11. Algeria has always resolutely supported efforts and initiatives aimed at promoting the creation of a Middle East NWFZ. In the framework of the Arab Group, it is one of the sponsors of the resolution on the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East, and it supports the resolution on the Establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East, adopted annually by the General Assembly. It also supported the resolution entitled "Application of the IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East", the latest version of which was adopted by the General Conference of the IAEA in 2014 (GC(58)/RES/16); and it is a joint sponsor of the resolution entitled "Israeli nuclear capacities" adopted by the 53rd ordinary session of the General Conference of the IAEA in 2009 (GC (53)/RES/17). It remains open to all United Nations initiatives aimed at launching a genuine negotiation process resulting in the implementation of the 1995 resolution pursuant to its mandate.

2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.: General
7 May 2015

Original: English

New York, 27 April-22 May 2015

Implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions agreed to during the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*

Report submitted by South Africa

I. Introduction

1. As an integral part of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which recognised the continued validity of the decisions of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences, it was agreed in Action 20 that:

> "States parties should submit regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, on the implementation of the present action plan, as well as of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996."

II. Report

2. Since becoming a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1991, South Africa has committed itself to the full implementation of all Treaty provisions. In this regard, South Africa has adopted domestic legislation, including the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, No 87 of 1993, and the Nuclear Energy Act, No. 46 of 1999, both of which provide domestic effect to South Africa's obligations under the NPT regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the application of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes, aimed at the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons.

* The present document is issued without formal editing.

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3. Regarding the implementation of past agreements reached at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, South Africa has adopted the following measures.

A. Nuclear disarmament (actions steps 1-22)

4. In terms of the measures and practical steps agreed to in the Final Documents of the 1995, 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences, South Africa has implemented the following measures.

Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

5. South Africa signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on 24 September 1996 and ratified the Treaty without condition on 30 March 1999. South Africa has worked on a continuous basis, both in its national capacity and in the context of the political, regional and other groupings in which it participates, to promote the CTBT in general and also to promote its entry into force through the early signature and ratification of the Treaty, especially by those States whose ratification are required for its entry into force. It is therefore deeply regrettable that the ratifications by a small number of States whose ratification is required for the entry-into-force of the Treaty remain outstanding, despite positive pronouncements made to that effect by some States. The continued failure by these States to ratify the Treaty weakens the non-proliferation regime and brings into question their commitment towards the implementation of agreements reached during consecutive NPT Review Conferences and raises questions as to the credibility of the step-by-step approach towards nuclear disarmament.

Test moratorium

6. While the moratorium on nuclear testing was adopted by the nuclear-weapon States, South Africa has, nationally and in co-operation with other groupings, worked actively to promote the continued maintenance of this moratorium pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

Fissile material treaty (FMT) negotiations

7. On a fissile material treaty, South Africa — like many other States — has been disappointed by the continuing failure of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to commence negotiations on a fissile material treaty. To achieve this goal, South Africa has adopted a flexible attitude on the negotiations for a programme of work in the CD, and we continue to call on the other CD Members to adopt a similar approach. We believe that the narrow national and unilateralist objectives that have to date underpinned the CD's failure should not be permitted to frustrate the objectives of the international community as a whole. The failures of the CD, which is financed by all of the Members of the United Nations through the payment of their assessments to the UN, will in the longer term undermine the validity of the CD's claim to be the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community.

8. South Africa has nevertheless itself taken, or participated in, a number of initiatives to move the FMT forward. In this regard, South Africa has:

(a) Submitted to the UN Secretary General its views on the possible scope and requirements of the Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) during 2013;

(b) Participated actively in the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to UNGA resolution 67/53 (2012);

(c) Co-sponsored and supported resolutions during the General Assembly that urges the CD to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on a FMT.

Nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament (CD)

9. The persistent failure of the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a Programme of Work has greatly hampered further efforts related to nuclear disarmament, despite the fact that general agreement exists that the question of nuclear disarmament concerns the entire international community. As already mentioned, South Africa will continue to maintain a flexible attitude towards negotiations for a Programme of Work in the CD.

10. South Africa remains concerned over the large number of nuclear weapons that are deployed and stockpiled around the world and the possibility that these destructive weapons could be used. We therefore believe that the Conference on Disarmament should not further delay the establishment of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, as also agreed to in Action 6 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document.

11. As the only country to date to have voluntarily and unilaterally destroyed its nuclear weapons capability, South Africa remains convinced that the possession of these weapons — or the pursuit of such possession by certain States — does not enhance international peace and security. We will therefore continue our efforts towards nuclear disarmament in order to achieve a world free from the scourge of nuclear weapons.

Irreversibility

12. The practical step of irreversibility forms an essential component of the arms control process, particularly insofar as reductions in the number of nuclear weapons are concerned. In this regard, South Africa holds the view that further reductions of nuclear weapons would underpin our endeavours to achieve nuclear disarmament and also strengthen international peace, stability and security.

13. Reductions and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be included as an integral part of the nuclear-arms reduction and disarmament process, whilst such reductions should be carried out in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner. South Africa has consistently called upon the nuclear-weapon States to implement their disarmament obligations and commitments in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner.

14. It has long been our view that disarmament and non-proliferation are inextricably linked, and that real and irreversible movement on nuclear disarmament would reinforce the irreversibility of non-proliferation. We therefore view with concern any development that would disturb this balance and that would undermine our goal of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. The decision by North Korea to withdraw from the NPT remains a matter of concern, and South Africa calls on

the DPRK to rejoin the NPT without further delay. In this context, South Africa also continues to call on India, Israel and Pakistan to forego the nuclear weapons option and become parties to the NPT.

Unequivocal undertaking

15. South Africa welcomed the unequivocal undertaking by the States Parties, including the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. This was one of the most significant decisions that have been taken in the history of the NPT. It should be recognised that the decision to make this unequivocal commitment by the nuclear-weapon States, who actually possess these weapons with such destructive power, was a decision based on their own recognition of their legal and moral obligation to rid the world of these weapons that have unspeakable capacity to cause suffering and destruction. For this reason, we are concerned about the lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States that would demonstrate progress on their commitment to the unequivocal undertaking. While we welcome the progress made towards the reduction in the number of nuclear weapons, we remain concerned about qualitative improvements to existing weapons and the development of new weapons that contradicts the solemn undertaking made by the nuclear-weapon States.

START and the ABM Treaty

16. On the issue of START, New START and the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM), South Africa recalls that the abrogation of the ABM Treaty has brought about an additional element of uncertainty. We had warned that this could also have grave consequences for the future of global security, and create apparent rationales for action based solely on unilateral concerns. Any action — including the development of missile defence systems — which could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, is of concern to the international community and South Africa likewise remains concerned about the risk of a new arms race on earth and in outer space. We welcome the implementation of the New START agreement and progress made in this regard, but note with concern that the Russian Federation and the United States have yet to commence discussions on deeper cuts, as agreed to during 2010.

Trilateral Initiative

17. South Africa believes that the Trilateral Initiative between the United States, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which sought to reduce the level of weapons-grade material in the two countries and place the resulting material under IAEA control, would have significantly contributed to nuclear disarmament efforts. We reiterate our call for the implementation of the commitments made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference and the resumption of the Trilateral Initiative.

Steps by the nuclear-weapon States

18. South Africa continues to express concern over the lack of progress in the steps to be taken by the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international security and stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all. The various elements of the steps to be taken by the

nuclear-weapon States have consistently been supported by South Africa, such as the need for increased transparency, the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, and the engagement of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons. South Africa has on numerous occasions, and in various disarmament fora, called for progress in the pursuance of these steps, and will continue to do so.

Arrangements by nuclear-weapon States for verification of non-military fissile material

19. South Africa continues to support the placing by all the nuclear-weapon States of fissile material no longer required for military purposes under international verification. In this regard and consistent with the NPT Final Documents, the NAC's annual resolution at the General Assembly calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to make arrangements for the placing, as soon as possible, of fissile material no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and to make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The NAC also submitted a working paper to the 2012 NPT Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference on the issue of verification of nuclear disarmament measures, recalling past agreements.

General and complete disarmament

20. Regarding the step on general and complete disarmament, South Africa has for many years now maintained its commitment to a policy of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control that covers all weapons of mass destruction and extends to concerns relating to the proliferation of conventional weapons. This policy forms an integral part of its commitment to democracy, human rights, sustainable development, social justice and environmental protection. South Africa will endeavour to continue playing an active role in all arms control and disarmament issues, including in the areas of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, landmines, small arms and light weapons, missiles and other conventional weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Nuclear disarmament remains an indispensable step towards the achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Reporting

21. On the practical step of reporting, South Africa strongly supports the principle of regular reporting, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the NPT, by all States Parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament".

Development of verification capabilities

22. The issue of verification lies at the heart of the disarmament and arms control process and in South Africa's view forms a critical element of that process. South Africa has continued to support activities aimed at strengthening and developing verification capabilities to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-

free world. It will also be recalled that in previous NAC papers the view was expressed that the IAEA was the most relevant international body to develop verification mechanisms or a verification mechanism for a world free of nuclear weapons. South Africa remains of this view.

B. Nuclear non-proliferation (actions steps 23-46)

Universal adherence to the Treaty

23. South Africa believes that States currently outside the Treaty should accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States without conditions.

Safeguards

24. South Africa is committed to the highest level of safeguards, i.e. integrated safeguards. South Africa implements the Agreement of 16 September 1991 between itself and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the NPT. South Africa also concluded and implements an Additional Protocol signed on 13 September 2002. South Africa is working towards the optimum combination of these agreements.

25. South Africa has consistently supported the conclusion and application of safeguards agreements by all States Parties to the Treaty. It is promising that a growing number of States are concluding an additional protocol with the Agency. This indicated the continued commitment of NNWS to their non-proliferation obligations under Article III of the Treaty.

Transfers and physical protection of nuclear material

26. South African policy is guided by the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, No. 87 of 1993 and the Nuclear Energy Act, No. 46 of 1999. Under the terms of Act 87 of 1993, the Non-Proliferation Council of South Africa (NPC) was established to control and manage matters relating to the proliferation of such weapons. The legislation additionally links efforts to promote non-proliferation by stating that South Africa may determine general policy with a view to the encouragement of bilateral and multilateral efforts to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. Under Act 46 of 1999, the peaceful application of nuclear energy, including the safety and physical protection of nuclear material and facilities, as well as rules regarding the transfer of material outside the Republic of South Africa are dealt with comprehensively. This includes the commitment to ensure that no transfer would contribute to any nuclear weapons programme, whether this relates to transfers to a nuclear-weapon State or non-nuclear-weapon States.

27. South Africa is also party to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), which prohibits the production, use, stockpiling and placement of nuclear weapons on the African Continent. The Pelindaba Treaty was opened for signature in Cairo on 11 April 1996. All 53 members of the African Union have signed the Treaty.

C. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy (actions steps 47-64)

Peaceful nuclear cooperation

28. The Treaty emphasises peaceful nuclear co-operation and access to the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as one of its core objectives. Under the Treaty, States Parties have agreed undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

29. South Africa believes that it is critical that States honour their obligations under Article IV of the Treaty, without attempts to re-interpret or restrict its terms. South Africa implements its obligations under the Treaty through support for the IAEA's Technical Co-operation Programme (TCP). South Africa participates in the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development (AFRA). The Agreement establishes regional cooperation in the field of nuclear science and technology in Africa.

30. South Africa has made extra-budgetary contributions through its African Renaissance Fund to *Improve Veterinary Laboratory Capacities in Sub-Saharan Africa for the Early and Rapid Diagnoses and Control of Various Transboundary Animal Diseases*. This project has also benefited from the Peaceful Uses Initiative and will significantly contribute to food security and poverty reduction on the African continent, in line with South Africa's commitment to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Appropriate and effective levels of safety and security

31. Nuclear activities in South Africa are regulated by the National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) established under the National Nuclear Regulator Act, 47 of 1999, which includes the provision of safety standards and regulatory practices for protection of persons, property and the environment against nuclear damage. The NNR is responsible for fulfilling national obligations in respect of international legal instruments concerning nuclear safety.

Relevant nuclear conventions

32. South Africa is a signatory to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel and the African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA). The process to accede to the 2005 amendment to the CPPNM is in progress.

III. Conclusion

33. South Africa's commitment to the full implementation of the decisions of NPT Review Conferences through concrete national measures under the three Treaty pillars provides evidence of its continued commitment towards fulfilling the central

goal of the NPT, namely the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, South Africa remains deeply concerned about the lack of commitment shown by the nuclear-weapon States in fulfilling their side of the NPT bargain. The inaction and resistance by the nuclear-weapon States towards the implementation of their nuclear disarmament obligations and policy pronouncements aimed at justifying the continued possession of these weapons weaken the NPT regime and encourages proliferation.

34. While South Africa will continue to focus on promoting nuclear disarmament, ensuring that its non-proliferation obligations are met and encouraging other States to do the same, it will also continue to support and protect the inalienable right of States to develop, use and access nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, consistent with their developmental goals.

2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.: General
8 May 2015

Original: English

New York, 27 April-22 May 2015

Financial report

I. Introduction

1. The present financial report is submitted pursuant to the request by the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

2. To promote greater financial transparency and accountability and taking into account the practice of multilateral and other organizations, the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at the 12th plenary meeting of its second session, on 6 May 2008, adopted a decision in which it requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to provide a financial report to the Review Conference and each session of its Preparatory Committee, to be circulated as an official document.

3. Recalling that the costs associated with the preparation and holding of the Review Conference and the sessions of its Preparatory Committee were to be borne by the States parties to the Treaty and that there would be no financial implications for the regular budget of the United Nations, the Committee agreed, at the same meeting, that assessed and outstanding dues must be paid in proper time.

II. Observations

4. While most States parties are meeting their financial obligations, in some cases amounts outstanding since 1995 remain to be paid.

III. Financial status

5. The following table provides information, as at 8 May 2015, on the amounts owed by States parties for each Review Conference cycle since 1995.

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Amounts outstanding from States parties, by Review Conference cycle

(United States dollars)

	Review Conference cycle						
State party	*2015 Review Conference and 2015-III*	*2015-II*	*2015-I*	*2010*	*2005*	*1995 and 2000*	*Total*
Afghanistan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Albania	275	–	–	–	–	–	275
Algeria	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Andorra	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Angola	449	26	–	–	–	–	475
Antigua and Barbuda	69	–	–	–	–	–	69
Argentina	15 344	–	–	–	–	–	15 344
Armenia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Australia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Austria	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Azerbaijan	1 738	125	117	–	–	–	1 980
Bahamas	519	–	–	–	–	–	519
Bahrain	963	–	–	–	–	–	963
Bangladesh	449	91	62	–	–	–	602
Barbados	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Belarus	–	–	–	–	–	–	526
Belgium	–	–	–	–	–	–	25
Belize	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Benin	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bhutan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	393	57	63	304	284	381	1 482
Bosnia and Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Botswana	729	158	178	327	–	–	1 392
Brazil	126 586	13 979	12 129	–	–	–	152 513
Brunei Darussalam	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Burkina Faso	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Burundi	37	–	–	–	–	–	37
Cabo Verde	56	11	13	–	–	–	80
Cambodia		–	–	–	–	–	–
Cameroon	24	–	–	–	–	–	24
Canada	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Central African Republic	56	11	13	70	31	272	454
Chad	112	23	25	33	–	38	231
Chile	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

State party	Review Conference cycle						Total
	2015 Review Conference and 2015-III	2015-II	2015-I	2010	2005	1995 and 2000	
China	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Colombia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Comoros	56	11	13	71	31	–	182
Congo	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Costa Rica	936	–	–	–	–	–	936
Côte d'Ivoire	449	91	61	–	–	–	601
Croatia	3 169	–	–	–	–	–	3 169
Cuba	2 136	–	–	–	–	–	2 136
Cyprus	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Czech Republic	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Democratic People's Republic of Korea[a]	281	57	63	187	–	980	1 568
Democratic Republic of the Congo	112	23	25	77	–	245	482
Denmark	16 531	–	–	–	–	–	16 531
Djibouti	56	11	8	–	–	–	75
Dominica	32	–	–	–	–	–	32
Dominican Republic	1 963	362	380	–	–	–	2 705
Ecuador	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Egypt	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
El Salvador	673	158	178	1 113	694	489	3 305
Equatorial Guinea	449	23	–	–	–	–	472
Eritrea	41	–	–	71	31	272	415
Estonia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Ethiopia	449	68	76	60	–	–	653
Fiji	62	–	–	–	–	–	62
Finland	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
France	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Gabon	491	–	–	220	284	245	1 240
Gambia	56	11	13	71	–	245	396
Georgia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Germany	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Ghana	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Greece	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Grenada	20	–	–	–	–	–	20
Guatemala	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Guinea	56	23	25	71	95	167	437
Guinea-Bissau	56	11	13	33	–	245	358
Guyana	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Haiti	64	–	–	–	–	–	64

State party	Review Conference cycle						Total
	2015 Review Conference and 2015-III	2015-II	2015-I	2010	2005	1995 and 2000	
Holy See	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Honduras	335	–	–	–	–	–	335
Hungary	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Iceland	644	–	–	–	–	–	644
Indonesia	8 740	–	–	–	–	–	8 740
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	15 268	1 992	1 555	–	–	–	18 915
Iraq	2 692	–	–	–	–	–	2 692
Ireland	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Italy[b]	108 711	–	–	–	–	–	108 711
Jamaica	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Japan[b]	264 073	–	–	–	–	–	264 073
Jordan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Kazakhstan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Kenya	561	102	114	316	–	–	1 093
Kiribati	56	11	13	33	–	–	113
Kuwait	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Kyrgyzstan	112	11	13	71	31	977	1 215
Lao People's Democratic Republic	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Latvia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Lebanon	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Lesotho	41	–	–	–	–	–	41
Liberia	34	3	–	–	–	–	37
Libya	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Liechtenstein	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Lithuania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Luxembourg	2 457	–	–	–	–	–	2 457
Madagascar	112	6	–	–	–	–	118
Malawi	112	11	13	71	–	118	325
Malaysia	6 983	–	–	–	–	–	6 983
Maldives	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Mali	168	23	25	71	31	272	559
Malta	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Marshall Islands	56	11	13	34	–	–	114
Mauritania	112	11	13	71	31	272	510
Mauritius	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Mexico	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Micronesia (Federated States of)	56	11	13	52	–	–	132
Monaco	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

State party	Review Conference cycle						Total
	2015 Review Conference and 2015-III	2015-II	2015-I	2010	2005	1995 and 2000	
Mongolia	64	–	–	–	–	–	64
Montenegro	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Morocco	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Mozambique	64	–	–	–	–	–	64
Myanmar	266	–	–	–	–	–	266
Namibia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Nauru	56	7	–	–	–	–	63
Nepal	281	57	75	76	6	–	559
Netherlands	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
New Zealand	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Nicaragua	112	23	25	83	32	64	339
Niger	65	–	–	–	–	–	65
Nigeria	3 870	292	–	–	–	–	4 162
Norway[b]	20 973	–	–	–	–	–	20 973
Oman	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Palau	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Panama	352	–	–	–	–	–	352
Papua New Guinea	22	–	–	–	–	–	22
Paraguay	449	57	40	–	–	–	546
Peru	1 524	–	–	–	–	–	1 524
Philippines	6 618	218	–	–	–	–	6 836
Poland	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Portugal	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Qatar	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Republic of Korea	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Republic of Moldova	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Romania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Russian Federation	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Rwanda	112	11	13	34	–	–	170
Saint Kitts and Nevis	56	11	9	–	–	–	76
Saint Lucia	32	–	–	33	63	201	329
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	56	11	9	–	–	–	76
Samoa	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
San Marino	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Sao Tome and Principe	56	11	13	33	–	245	358
Saudi Arabia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Senegal	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Serbia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

State party	Review Conference cycle						Total
	2015 Review Conference and 2015-III	2015-II	2015-I	2010	2005	1995 and 2000	
Seychelles	56	23	25	45	–	245	394
Sierra Leone	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Singapore	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Slovakia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Slovenia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Solomon Islands	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Somalia	9	–	–	–	–	–	9
South Africa	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Spain	72 969	–	–	–	–	–	72 969
Sri Lanka	1 066	158	178	391	–	–	1 793
Sudan	449	91	62	–	–	–	602
Suriname	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Swaziland	112	23	25	83	–	272	515
Sweden	23 506	–	–	–	–	–	23 506
Switzerland	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Syrian Arab Republic	1 570	215	241	516	–	–	2 542
Tajikistan	112	23	25	33	–	–	193
Thailand	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	226	–	–	–	–	–	226
Timor-Leste	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Togo	56	11	13	24	–	–	104
Tonga	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Trinidad and Tobago	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Tunisia	1 570	260	292	417	–	–	2 539
Turkey	34 151	–	–	–	–	–	34 151
Turkmenistan	841	226	254	130	–	–	1 451
Tuvalu	56	11	13	33	–	245	358
Uganda	281	57	63	64	–	–	465
Ukraine	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
United Arab Emirates	21 245	–	–	–	–	–	21 245
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
United Republic of Tanzania	228	–	–	–	–	–	228
United States of America	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Uruguay	280	–	–	–	–	–	280
Uzbekistan	673	91	101	446	96	–	1 407
Vanuatu	56	11	13	33	–	27	140
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	27 033	2 693	2 597	–	–	–	32 323

State party	Review Conference cycle						Total
	2015 Review Conference and 2015-III	2015-II	2015-I	2010	2005	1995 and 2000	
Viet Nam	1 794	283	317	356	567	–	2 750
Yemen	449	91	101	375	189	245	1 450
Zambia	166	–	–	–	–	–	166
Zimbabwe	112	23	25	197	–	–	357
Total	**811 454**	**22 329**	**19 744**	**6 906**	**1 898**	**6 762**	**869 093**

[a] The status of the membership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is uncertain.
[b] The Permanent Mission confirmed that the payment had been processed, but it has not yet been received in the United Nations General Fund account.

NPT/CONF.2015/46

2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.: General
11 May 2015

Original: English

New York, 27 April-22 May 2015

Co-Chairs' summary of the regional round table on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and the prospects for a ban treaty*

Submission by Thailand

1. On 26-27 March 2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, in collaboration with the WMD Project of the International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI) of Norway, co-organised the 9th regional round table on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and the prospects for a ban treaty at the Hua Chang Heritage Hotel, Bangkok, Thailand. A total of 34 participants attended the roundtable meeting, 24 of whom were government officials, the rest from civil society and academia. The meeting began in the morning of 26 March and ended at lunch time on 27 March 2015. The meeting started with an introductory session, followed by 4 substantive sessions on the prospects of the humanitarian initiative and nuclear disarmament. Each of the sessions began with introductory remarks from previously identified participants. The discussions were carried out under Chatham House Rules, and co-chaired by representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand and ILPI.

Introductory session

2. Presentations were given on the overview of nuclear weapons; the immediate and long-term consequences of nuclear explosions; the NPT and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs); the South-East Asia NWFZ; the current status of nuclear disarmament; and, expectations for the upcoming 2015 NPT Review Conference.

3. Several participants pointed to the disappointing lack of progress in nuclear disarmament. It was emphasised that the legal framework must allow for an effective mechanism aimed at the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, non-nuclear-weapon states should strengthen their efforts to persuade nuclear-weapon states as well as the 4 states outside the NPT to engage in the process, possibly by convincing the members of parliament in each of those countries.

* The present document is issued without formal editing.

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4. A participant expressed the view that the humanitarian initiative paved way for renewing focus on nuclear disarmament, and suggested that useful outcomes of previous conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons should be included in the outcome document of the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

Session 1: Status of the humanitarian initiative

5. A presenter opined that the humanitarian initiative had changed the discourse on how nuclear disarmament is perceived, departing from the traditional theory of national security doctrines based on nuclear deterrence.

6. Many participants viewed that the humanitarian initiative had raised public awareness of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons and made the issue of nuclear disarmament more approachable to the wider public. It was also pointed out that the humanitarian initiative provided an opportunity for new actors to engage in the discussion on nuclear disarmament, particularly those countries that were not previously affected by the explosion of nuclear weapons.

7. A number of participants spoke in support of the Austrian Pledge, and encouraged more countries to join the pledge.

8. At the same time, some participants sought clarification on the status of the pledge and its role in leading to further concrete actions. For instance, how would the pledge feed into international processes such as that those related to the NPT? One participant noted that the pledge contained less number of actions than previously listed in the outcome document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

9. Many participants agreed that the humanitarian initiative had been gaining increasing momentum, but at the same time expressed their concerns that nuclear-weapon states are unlikely to take a lead role or fully cooperate in a process to ban and eliminate nuclear weapons. Therefore, many viewed that non-nuclear-weapon states should take advantage of this strong momentum to change the status quo and initiate concrete actions, with steps clearly outlined.

10. An analogy to the ban on nuclear weapons was raised by one participant with regard to the ban on smoking. The smoking ban was not initiated or driven by smokers. Nevertheless, societal norms continued to develop in such a way that smoking became less acceptable in public places. A similar analogy was made using the example of torture and slavery.

11. Many participants stressed the need to spread the discussions on this issue to involve as many sectors as possible, including high-level government officials, in order to create and sustain the political will to achieve nuclear disarmament.

Recommendations for further actions

12. The participants made the following recommendation: Promote the discussions on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons to reach as wide a range of audience as possible, including high-level government officials and, where appropriate, members of parliament, to raise greater awareness on the issue. Civil society and government officials should also educate the general public on the dangers and threats from the existence of nuclear warheads in their countries, in order to impact and help convince members of parliament to engage more actively in the nuclear disarmament process.

Session 2: Towards the Review Conference

13. A presentation for this session touched on various aspects of the upcoming 2015 NPT Review Conference, such as challenges to the implementation of the NPT, the success criteria for the NPT Review Conference and expectations for the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

14. It was pointed out that major challenges to the implementation of the NPT stemmed from diverse preferences and priorities given to the implementation of the 3 pillars by the state parties, and the lack of compliance to Article VI of the NPT by nuclear-weapon states.

15. A presenter viewed that success of the 2015 NPT Review Conference would depend on progress in nuclear disarmament, the outcome of the Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties Establishing Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and Mongolia, progress in establishing a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East, and the status of negotiations on Iran's nuclear program.

16. Many participants expressed their concerns that the 2015 NPT Review Conference would not be able to meet expectations.

17. Regarding how the humanitarian initiative is relevant to the NPT process, a participant opined that the initiative actually provided for "positive pressure" on the international community by providing for an opportunity to discuss further actions on nuclear disarmament not necessarily limited to the NPT.

18. A participant questioned the value of specifying timeframes in the outcome document, especially because the previously agreed timeframe had not been adhered to by nuclear-weapon states. It was further emphasised that non-nuclear-weapon states needed to be prepared to move ahead, even without an agreed time frame by nuclear-weapon states. It was further suggested that like-minded non-nuclear-weapon states utilise the time during the 2015 NPT Review Conference to have a focused discussion on filling the legal gap regarding the prohibition and the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

19. Some participants argued that timeframes remained necessary for the outcome document. It was then suggested that a condition could be created to provide incentives for nuclear-weapon states to adhere to such a time frame.

20. A participant mentioned the NAM working paper on elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons, with a phased programme and specific timeline for each step towards a nuclear weapons convention. This paper could serve as a basis for further development on this front.

21. One participant opined that successful nuclear disarmament efforts must engage all nuclear-weapon states.

22. However, many participants underlined that nuclear-weapon states can be engaged without having to officially participate in the initiation of any formal process. Engagement does not necessarily mean waiting for everybody to agree before moving ahead.

23. A participant remarked that while nuclear-weapon states are not required to be on board from the beginning of the process, it is important to maintain our efforts to convince them to participate. This can be done by creating public pressure on the politicians regarding the safety and security of the people amidst the presence of

nuclear warheads within those countries. It was important to change the "narrative" of the issue by continuing to question the legitimacy of nuclear weapons.

Recommendations for further actions

24. The participants made the following recommendation: Organize a meeting of disarmament officials from states that are in support of a ban treaty process on the sidelines of the 2015 NPT Review Conference to discuss further actions and steps to initiate and take forward the process for a ban treaty.

Session 3: Closing the legal gap

25. Presenters for this Session noted that "closing the legal gap" necessarily involves legal and political considerations.

26. With reference to the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* (ICJ Advisory Opinion, 1996) it becomes clear that key gaps include; (1) the need for agreement among NWS in order to achieve the goals of nuclear disarmament, although an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects does exist, (2) no comprehensive prohibition on nuclear weapons exists, which is not the case for all other weapons of mass destruction, (3) the legality of the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self-defence is inconclusive, and (4) debates on the place of "Deterrence" in international law continue.

27. It was suggested that the survival of humanity ought to take precedence over the survival of an individual state. There are also questions raised as to whether legal arguments such as duress and proportionality were appropriate or could be relied upon in the nuclear weapons context. Legal issues in NWFZs, including rights of passage for ships carrying nuclear weapons were also discussed.

28. The absence of an expressed prohibition on nuclear weapons remains the most significant legal gap.

29. The obligation under Art.VI of the NPT to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control, is an obligation of result. Legal action, such as those instituted by the Marshall Islands, is one way to bring about this result.

30. A presenter observed that on the political side, reform of the international architecture is necessary, to end justifications for the continued existence and possession of nuclear weapons, and to promote "common human morality". Environmental, health, human rights and dignity and protection of civilians should also be addressed.

31. On this point, a presenter suggested that processes towards a ban treaty could be promoted by non-nuclear-weapon states, otherwise the continuing inaction would result in a lost opportunity, agency and power.

32. A presenter took issue with the notion that a new ban treaty would undermine the NPT. That would only be the case if the NPT was designed to legitimise nuclear weapons.

33. Participants generally agreed that a comprehensive prohibition on nuclear weapons, by way of a ban treaty, would most effectively close the legal gaps.

34. At the same time, participants debated widely on the extent and timing to engage nuclear-weapon states in processes towards the said ban treaty. While some noted that processes should always involve nuclear-weapon states, others proposed that, without antagonising or excluding any party, non-nuclear-weapon states should take the lead role in initiating the process while ensuring that no party is in a position to obstruct these efforts. Additionally, focus could first be placed upon "prohibition" before "elimination" of nuclear weapons.

35. In either case, the sentiment of the room was that regardless of involvement by nuclear-weapon states, non-nuclear-weapon states and other interested sectors should push ahead and engage nuclear-weapon states at a suitable point.

36. The role of civil society in these processes was also discussed. In particular, a participant proposed that civil society actively engage states by drafting any necessary documents needed to help trigger diplomatic negotiations on a possible ban treaty.

37. Participants noted conceptual and policy difficulties faced by states which claim to support disarmament, while remaining part of security regimes that rely on nuclear weapons. A question of prohibition extending to military doctrines that incorporate nuclear weapons was also raised.

38. It was noted that shifts in norms, conditions and attitudes take time, therefore action to stigmatise nuclear weapons which should help to facilitate changes in policy, should be taken as soon as possible.

39. Although politically, existing international infrastructures maintain nuclear weapons in a privileged position, many participants noted that there is now already a shift of legal and societal norms, attitudes and conditions which could eventually affect changes in customary international law and state practice. These emerging shifts are in no small part attributable to the Humanitarian Initiative, which has raised awareness, revitalised and reshaped the agenda.

Recommendations for further actions

40. The participants made the following recommendations:

(a) States can initiate discussions aimed at beginning an appropriate diplomatic process to address the legal gaps, with the drafting and general support of civil society and key lead countries with the technical and political capacity to do so;

(b) Other legal channels that could be considered include submitting a request for another ICJ Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the dynamics of the Court and changes in circumstances since 1996. States may also opt to join in legal action such as that being pursued by the Marshall Islands to give effect to international commitments;

(c) Occasions such as the 70th Anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Bombings may also provide greater publicity and impetus toward future progress in these fields.

Session 4: Role of States in Asia and the Pacific

41. The presenters of this Session discussed opportunities and ways in which Asia-Pacific states can play a role in efforts to address the legal gaps.

42. A presenter suggested that Asia-Pacific states could signal commitment by hosting relevant meetings towards this purpose.

43. Ongoing engagement with nuclear-weapon states also remains a crucial element in efforts to deal with legal gaps.

44. A presenter reiterated that the Humanitarian Initiative has "reinvigorated" the discourse and led to a reconsideration of existing norms, and expressed a view that movements for the elimination of nuclear weapons can be led by those states whose positions on this issue are clear.

45. Moreover, in one presenter's view, efforts in support of a ban treaty could be made by states, notwithstanding existing security alliances within the region.

46. Participants noted the importance of presenting the case for the prohibition of nuclear weapons to the political leaders in respective states as a necessary step towards achieving tangible results.

47. Participants recognized two regional mechanisms, ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which could contribute to advancing these agendas, with particular note on the potential of progress in SEANWFZ negotiations.

48. Participants noted a suggestion that new customary international law could come about as a result of changes in state practice regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence policies.

49. Participants discussed the need to change mentalities, shape public opinion and display political leadership. The commencement of a new ban treaty process would be one way to do so, although this ought not to undermine the NPT process.

50. Despite opportunities and potential roles Asia-Pacific states can have regarding these issues, the importance of various relationships with the P5 and other states would still factor significantly, while pressure from the P5 is to be expected. Views were raised, nonetheless, that as "friends", states can make their different positions known to others.

51. It was also suggested that while moves for a prohibition is key, ways forward by other means should also be considered.

Recommendations for further actions

52. The participants made the following recommendations:

(a) Non-nuclear-weapon states, including those in the Asia-Pacific, can play a role in addressing the legal gaps in the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, along with showing political commitment, those with technical and political capacity could assume leading roles;

(b) The outcomes of this Regional Roundtable should be conveyed to its participants, and more widely to interested organisations and governments, as well as to international forums and conferences, including the 2015 NPT Review Conference, to communicate viewpoints and encourage further action and engagement.

2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.: General
21 May 2015

Original: English

New York, 27 April-22 May 2015

Schedule of division of costs

In accordance with the cost-sharing formula adopted by the Conference contained in the appendix to the draft rules of procedure (see NPT/CONF.2015/1, annex III), the following is the schedule for the division of costs based on the actual participation of States parties in the Conference:

State party	*Percentage share of estimated total costs*
Afghanistan	0.004
Albania	0.008
Algeria	0.106
Andorra	0.006
Angola	0.008
Antigua and Barbuda	0.002
Argentina	0.333
Armenia	0.005
Australia	1.598
Austria	0.615
Azerbaijan	0.031
Bahamas	0.013
Bahrain	0.030
Bangladesh	0.008
Barbados	0.006
Belarus	0.043
Belgium	0.769
Benin	0.002
Bhutan	0.001
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	0.007
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.013
Botswana	0.013
Brazil	2.260

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State party	*Percentage share of estimated total costs*
Brunei Darussalam	0.020
Bulgaria	0.036
Burkina Faso	0.002
Cambodia	0.003
Cameroon	0.009
Canada	2.299
Central African Republic	0.001
Chad	0.002
Chile	0.257
China	0.910
Colombia	0.200
Comoros	0.001
Congo	0.004
Costa Rica	0.029
Côte d'Ivoire	0.008
Croatia	0.097
Cuba	0.053
Cyprus	0.036
Czech Republic	0.297
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0.002
Denmark	0.520
Djibouti	0.001
Dominican Republic	0.035
Ecuador	0.034
Egypt	0.103
El Salvador	0.012
Estonia	0.031
Ethiopia	0.008
Finland	0.400
France	7.140
Gabon	0.015
Gambia	0.001
Georgia	0.005
Germany	5.501
Ghana	0.011
Greece	0.491
Guatemala	0.021
Guyana	0.001
Holy See	0.001
Honduras	0.006

State party	*Percentage share of estimated total costs*
Hungary	0.205
Iceland	0.021
Indonesia	0.267
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	0.274
Iraq	0.052
Ireland	0.322
Italy	3.427
Jamaica	0.008
Japan	8.345
Jordan	0.017
Kazakhstan	0.093
Kenya	0.010
Kiribati	0.001
Kuwait	0.210
Kyrgyzstan	0.002
Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.002
Latvia	0.036
Lebanon	0.032
Lesotho	0.001
Liberia	0.001
Libya	0.109
Liechtenstein	0.007
Lithuania	0.056
Luxembourg	0.062
Madagascar	0.002
Malawi	0.002
Malaysia	0.216
Maldives	0.001
Malta	0.012
Marshall Islands	0.001
Mauritania	0.002
Mexico	1.419
Monaco	0.009
Mongolia	0.002
Montenegro	0.004
Morocco	0.048
Mozambique	0.002
Myanmar	0.008
Namibia	0.008
Nauru	0.001

State party	*Percentage share of estimated total costs*
Nepal	0.005
Netherlands	1.274
New Zealand	0.195
Niger	0.002
Nigeria	0.069
Norway	0.656
Oman	0.079
Palau	0.001
Panama	0.020
Papua New Guinea	0.003
Peru	0.090
Philippines	0.119
Poland	0.710
Portugal	0.365
Qatar	0.161
Republic of Korea	1.536
Republic of Moldova	0.002
Romania	0.174
Russian Federation	8.000
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.001
Samoa	0.001
San Marino	0.002
Saudi Arabia	0.666
Senegal	0.005
Serbia	0.031
Singapore	0.296
Slovakia	0.132
Slovenia	0.077
South Africa	0.287
Spain	2.290
Sri Lanka	0.019
State of Palestine[a]	
Sudan	0.008
Suriname	0.003
Swaziland	0.002
Sweden	0.740
Switzerland	0.807
Syrian Arab Republic	0.028
Tajikistan	0.002
Thailand	0.184

State party	*Percentage share of estimated total costs*
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	0.006
Timor-Leste	0.002
Togo	0.001
Trinidad and Tobago	0.034
Tunisia	0.028
Turkey	1.023
Turkmenistan	0.015
Ukraine	0.076
United Arab Emirates	0.458
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	6.130
United Republic of Tanzania	0.007
United States of America	32.820
Uruguay	0.040
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	0.483
Viet Nam	0.032
Yemen	0.008
Zambia	0.005
Zimbabwe	0.002

[a] The assessment percentage figure is yet to be determined.